Introduction and Context
In part one of this piece (published on this same site), I touched on some of the security issues that emerged from the revelations by the Ministers of the Interior and Defence. To this end, I provided a brief historical background of police recruitment. Next, I offered some conceptual framework, within which I situated my observations about what the revelations mean for (police) legitimacy in particular, and democratic Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) more generally. I supported my arguments by drawing on recent findings and past examples from Ghana and elsewhere to illustrate and substantiate them.
In what follows in this part II, I attempt to scrutinise what the rest of the revelations around some unaccountable ammunition mean for our national security, but argue from the perspective of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Armed and Light Weapons (SALW) as well as Ghana’s role as a potential homegrown model for democratic security governance in Africa.
I conclude this piece with some practical and policy suggestions, drawing on my limited experience and modest expertise.
ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), their ammunition and other related materials
To understand the seriousness and national embarrassment associated with the revelation of the unaccounted ammunition, a brief history of West Africa’s link to this subject is necessary.
Members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have, since the early 1990s, known that the problem of the illicit proliferation of SALW poses an existential threat to peacebuilding and democracy in West Africa (for further details, see Kwesi Aning’s articles on this subject).
Moreover, that is why ECOWAS mandates its members to set up their small arms commissions. The reason for this is simultaneously simple and complex. The illicit proliferation of SALW, their ammunition and related material has a devastating effect at the regional, national and sub-national levels. It undermines peaceful elections, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, human rights, gender equality and all of the other cardinal principles of liberal democratic governance.
In a region where the states are inextricably connected in several ways, security developments in one state affect the others in ways that make the distinctions between state and regional security more superfluous than real.
It was because of the seriousness of the problem that ECOWAS first adopted a voluntary moratorium in 1998 to try to address the problem of illicit proliferation before a more concrete and legally binding convention was adopted. This is the ECOWAS CONVENTION ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS, THEIR AMMUNITION AND OTHER RELATED MATERIALS.
The problem of the illegal proliferation of these weapons became an even more serious problem following the fall of Gaddafi in Libya, and the associated weapons that flooded the region from the unbridled access to them from state stockpiles in Libya. Added to this already concerning milieu are the activities of bandits and jihadists in the Sahel, who trade in these weapons as though they were toy guns.
As a leading member of the Economic Community of West African States, and a signatory to the ECOWAS CONVENTION ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS, THEIR AMMUNITION AND OTHER RELATED MATERIALS, the revelation of what appears as poor stockpile management by the state is embarrassing and at odds with our international credentials. Due to our standing, we always have to demonstrate exceptional stockpile management skills.
This is where Ghana, as a leading member of ECOWAS with enviable democratic credentials, needs to set a high standard with regard to her stockpile management. The rising use of such weapons in Ghana, which undermines peace, security and development, means that the state should send a real and symbolic message of its serious intention to deal with the problem of the illicit proliferation of these weapons.
As a member of the team that conducted the first baseline survey of small arms in Ghana, for the Small Arms Commission with funding from UNDP, I speak from the standpoint of one equipped with a modest degree of firsthand experience of the problem.
The illicit proliferation of arms and ammunition emanates from five traditional sources, which are listed in no particular order. These are viz:
(1) those smuggled into the country,
(2) leakages from state armouries (which were worse during military regimes),
(3) leakages from licensed importers,
(4) local manufacture and
(5) a few smuggled into the country from those who returned from abroad (including from missions).
What this means is that any leakages from the state stockpiles and armouries (no matter how limited, few and far between they may seem) must be prioritised and thoroughly investigated from a national interest perspective that goes beyond party lines. The missing ammunition is antithetical to our admirable credentials and may indicate a far bigger problem of poor stockpile management, which is known to fuel the illicit proliferation of SALW and their related ammunition. We need to pay urgent attention to this and find a solution.
What are some of our options going forward? To progress, we first need to recognise that scandals also incubate embryos of hope and solutions. Let me take a moment to explain what I mean by scandal and reform in the penultimate section below.
Scandals and Reform: Restoring Legitimacy after Scandal(s).
Scandals in the security sector are not new. For instance, regarding the police, Larry Sherman, a leading police scholar, is convinced that scandals are a defining feature of the police, which may precipitate meaningful reforms. Meaningful reform (meaningful underscored) is not the same as lengthy written inquiries that end up sitting on shelves.
A testament to how scandals have led to various reforms includes investigative commissions such as (a) the Knapp Commission Report, 1972 (USA), (b) the Mollen Commission, 1994 (USA), and (c) the Wood Commission, 1997 (Australia). These reports have often revealed and highlighted the underlying complexity of such challenges and ultimately how they undermined the legitimacy of (or, in other words, the trust and confidence in) the sector.
Unsurprisingly, in what has been described by criminologists as ‘the legitimacy turn’, the element of legitimacy in enhancing the criminal justice system in particular and SSR/G in general has been emphasised several times by systematic studies. From the optical prism of ‘Basic Legitimation Expectation’ to Tyler’s procedural justice and Bottom and Tankebe’s Beyond Procedural Justice, a common thread that runs through their (sometimes opposing) concepts is the issue of legitimacy (or, in other words, trust and confidence issues).
The scandals that we are seeing offer Ghana a unique opportunity to implement meaningful reform because, as stated above, scandals sometimes offer the opportunity for enlightened reforms and/or meaningful transformation.
Let me start concluding my thoughts on how we can turn this alledge scandle into meaningful reform by offering some steps drawn from my modest experience of working on these issues in Ghana and internationally since 1998; as someone who was part of the team from the African Security Dialogue and Research(ASDR) who once taught on the Security Sector Governance and Management course at the Ghana Armed Forces and Commsnd College (GAFCSC) in the late 2000s; as part of the team who conducted the first baslime survey on small arms in Ghana; as one of the few non blacksmiths who set up the first blacksmiths association in Ghana in 2003; as the first head of research at the National Peace Council, Ghana etc..
Conclusion and recommendations
Before I offer some practical and policy suggestions, let me recap my main ideas articulated above. My primary motive in writing this piece is twofold (essentially). (1) To make a modest contribution towards the often neglected but vital need to demystify security and make it interesting and relevant to the ordinary person, and (2) to achieve this by sharing some thoughts intended to further the conversation about democratic security sector governance and reform, and how, through such meaningful discussions and dialogues, we may gradually raise the security sector to a level that is equal to the best principles/practices.
Due to its international credentials, the standard for measuring what is expected of Ghana is high (in my opinion). We not only owe it to ourselves to meet this high standard, but we need to do so, too, for Africa, as an example of homegrown pride. So, the following are some nuggets that I think we could ponder when seeking a resilient, effective response to these two (and other related) problems the Ministers had revealed.
First, the problems that these revelations expose cannot solely be placed at the doorstep of the security agencies. It is like dealing with a problem in an ecosystem; solutions must be comprehensive and interlocking. These problems/revelations by the two ministers equally stem from poor accountability mechanisms and a lack of robust oversight on the part of those who have been charged to do so.
This includes (but is not limited to) the legislature, the bench, the media and other players with various oversight functions in the sector. Then there is the element of corruption. I think that these revelations are also a problem of CORRUPTION (broadly defined, and a leading national security threat to Ghana’s democracy).
[You can click to read Part I of this article]
Moreover, we need to find novel ways to strengthen the democratic oversight of the sector, including how we can use that to improve the welfare of our officers. In this regard, the old orientation of self-censorship among a wide range of critical players within the sector’s oversight structure has sustained this culture of poor oversight.
A result is sometimes what we see: highly undemocratic practices that go unchallenged. An enduring example is the lack of accountability after grotesque military brutalities and abuses against civilians (and occasionally the police) that virtually go unpunished (and sometimes justified by politicians when they are in power) and which are self-perpetuating.
Although the immediate revelations focus on how Ghana handles the staffing needs of its security sector as well as how it manages its state stockpiles and in turn contributes towards the regional efforts to address the illicit proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) and their related ammunitions and other related materials, the revelations must lead us to investigate more fully the auditing of our state owned armouries’ as well. This should not be opened to everyone.
The first meaningful step for reform is to have a genuine bipartisan consensus beginning from Parliament. Such an approach should place the nation ahead of partisan interests and loyalties.
We need to see the problem beyond the limited scope of security and broaden it to include such structural issues as the nature of active partisan politics in Ghana. Additionally, we need meaningful input from both active and retired securocrates and security officers, and other critical stakeholders from both the formal and informal sectors.
One of my major concerns is that, like other such scandals, there will be a lot of talk and visionary ideas, but such highfaluting plans will have very little or no traction on the ground and, in turn leave us – maybe – worse off than at the start because a change of government will also end up making similar claims/allegations.
Let me end with a caution. We can have all the fanciful recommendations on paper, but if corruption is NOT added to the variables, the intended goal will be notoriously elusive. That said, I remain optimistic about Ghana and Africa. It may take time, but we can build a strong continent in the next century, if the Lord tarries.
Recently, Hutchful, Agykeum, and Kunbour (2021) re-echoed the long-standing observations regarding democratic control of the security sector.
These authors assert that:
“Beyond the 1992 constitution, the effort to subordinate Ghana’s security sector to democratic control would be underpinned by the emerging international and regional discourse of democratic security sector governance, the basic principle of which held that all public institutions providing public goods and services should (without exception) be held to the same standard of accountability. These standards are equally applicable to the sectors providing security services to the citizens”.
I think they knit together my concluding thoughts excellently, and have nothing significant to add to this comment.
A vital caveat before I leave is necessary. If the allegations by the ministers are not entirely accurate or are unfounded, that too has its national security dimension, not least, a reflection of the continued belief among some that regime security outweighs national security (at any cost). A national security interest must transcend party lines and reinforce national cohesion through inclusivity and shared goals.
Each Ghanaian should be interested in contributing towards a more robust democratic oversight of our security sector, and also offer our officers all the needed support and encouragement. But I admit that such revelations reinforce the perception that the problems we face as a country (and as a continent) are both enormous and sometimes discouraging. But I remain optimistic and always encourage myself with this quote from Job 14:7 in the Bible
“For there is hope of a tree, if it be cut down, that it will sprout again, and that the tender branch thereof will not cease” (KJV).
Written by Emmanuel Sowatey. (PhD)
Email: [email protected]
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