In November 2012, during my tenure with an international organisation in Nigeria, I produced an analytical report examining Boko Haram’s overtures to dialogue. The insights generated in that context, I would argue, remain pertinent to contemporary analyses of the group’s trajectory and to what its strategic and tactical evolution discloses over time and across diverse sociopolitical spaces. I reproduce these reflections below, with minor modifications.
Abstract
This opinion paper examines the reported willingness of Boko Haram to enter peace talks with the Nigerian government. Drawing on contemporary political, socioeconomic, and security developments, it assesses whether this overture signals a genuine opportunity for conflict resolution or a strategic manoeuvre to regain strength. The analysis highlights the complex interplay between internal security governance, human rights concerns, socioeconomic drivers of radicalisation, and Nigeria’s role in regional stability. It concludes by identifying opportunities for security sector reform, civil society engagement, and cross-border cooperation as critical components for achieving sustainable peace.
1. Introduction
The insurgency waged by Jama’atu Ahlus Sunnah Lid Da’awati wal-Jihad—widely known as Boko Haram—remains one of Nigeria’s most pressing security concerns. Since its escalation in the early 2000s, the group has been held responsible for an estimated 2,000–3,000 deaths. Statements by Nigeria’s Chief of Army Staff, Lt-Gen. Azubuike Ihejirika, place the figure at roughly 3,000 casualties. These losses accompany significant economic repercussions; the UN Conference on Trade and Development has estimated that Nigeria may have lost as much as US$6 billion due to disruptions linked to Boko Haram’s activities.
The insurgency is unfolding within a broader national environment characterised by multiple security challenges—ranging from kidnappings and pastoral–agrarian conflicts to illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, arms smuggling, and crude-oil theft. Parallel soft-security risks, including widespread poverty, high youth unemployment, corruption, and recurrent natural disasters such as the 2012 floods, further compound the country’s fragility. Yet, notwithstanding these pressures, Nigeria retains the structural features of a relatively resilient democracy and remains a pivotal actor in regional peace and development.
The recent media reports indicating Boko Haram’s willingness to engage in dialogue raise important questions: Is this a credible opening for peace, or a tactical pause by the group to recalibrate? This paper situates Boko Haram’s reported peace overture within Nigeria’s larger security landscape and evaluates the prospects, risks, and requirements of a meaningful peace process.
2. Boko Haram’s reported call for dialogue
Although sporadic reports of Boko Haram expressing interest in negotiations have circulated previously, the 2012 announcement was distinctive in that the sect purportedly named specific individuals to facilitate the process. These include:
- General Muhammadu Buhari (former Head of State)
- Dr. Shettima Monguno (former Governor of Yobe State)
- Senator Bukar Ibrahim
- Ambassador Gaji Galtimari
- Aisha Alkali Wakil and her husband
The inclusion of a woman—Aisha Wakil—is especially striking. Extremist groups rooted in rigid interpretations of Islam have historically excluded women from decision-making roles. Groups such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, Ansar al-Din, and MUJWA typically reinforce patriarchal hierarchies and strict limitations on women’s public participation. Boko Haram’s inclusion of a woman may therefore signal one of several possibilities including:
- A leadership shift within the organisation following arrests or deaths of more radical members.
- A reflection of local sociocultural contexts, suggesting Boko Haram’s evolution is shaped by its immediate environment rather than strict doctrinal uniformity with global jihadist groups.
- A tactical attempt to soften public perception, presenting themselves as more socially inclusive than their ideological counterparts elsewhere.
The nomination list, therefore, raises the possibility—not certainty—of ideological fractures or the emergence of a less doctrinaire faction within the group. However, it also raises the possibility that Boko Haram seeks time to regroup and replenish after sustained military pressure.
3. Prospects and Risks of Peace Talks
Public opinion within Nigeria is deeply divided over whether negotiations should proceed. Advocates argue that almost any non-military route to peace is preferable to ongoing violence. Critics worry that negotiating with an insurgent group responsible for mass casualties may embolden other extremist actors and set a damaging precedent.
At present, it remains unclear whether Boko Haram envisages a negotiation, mediation, or dialogue mechanism, or whether the process would depend on the specific individuals named. The ambiguity complicates early assessments of the sincerity behind the overture.
Three considerations are central to evaluating the prospects of a genuine peace process:
3.1 Tactical vs. Strategic Intent
History shows that insurgent groups sometimes request talks to gain respite, reorganise, or secure concessions. Without verifiable indicators of strategic commitment to peace—such as cessation of attacks, internal cohesion, or articulated political demands—there is a risk that peace overtures constitute tactical deception.
3.2 The Challenge of Balancing Justice and Amnesty
Nigeria faces a dilemma common to post-conflict settings: balancing accountability for atrocities with political pragmatism. A credible process requires:
- prosecution of serious human rights abuses (by both Boko Haram and state actors),
- selective amnesty for lower-level offenders,
- mechanisms for truth-telling and reconciliation, and
- safeguards to prevent impunity.
Public sentiment in Nigeria is sharply polarised on this issue, and any peace arrangement will need to manage expectations around justice carefully.
3.3 Socioeconomic Drivers of Radicalization
The conditions that facilitated Boko Haram’s emergence—youth unemployment, poverty, corruption, injustice, and state neglect—remain largely unaddressed. Without targeted socioeconomic interventions, particularly in areas like Mubi and other recruitment hubs, any negotiated settlement risks unravelling.
4. Avoiding Counterproductive Security Practices
Experience from other counterterrorism contexts demonstrates that heavy-handed state responses—including extrajudicial killings, mass arrests, and indiscriminate force—tend to strengthen insurgent narratives and increase local support for violent extremism.
Reports by Amnesty International alleging widespread abuses by Nigeria’s Joint Task Force (JTF) highlight the risk of state violence fuelling further radicalisation. Statements in the Nigerian Senate, including allegations by Senator Bukar Abba Ibrahim that security forces have committed large-scale killings, reinforce the urgency of addressing this problem.
For peace to take root, the security sector must:
- adopt rights-respecting practices,
- improve accountability mechanisms,
- strengthen oversight by the judiciary, legislature, and national human rights institutions, and
- ensure that military operations do not alienate local communities.
5. Strengthening Civil Society and Media Engagement
Civil society organizations (CSOs), human rights groups, and the media hold crucial roles in shaping public discourse, documenting abuses, and promoting nonviolent conflict resolution. However, these actors require:
- technical support to conduct oversight of the security sector,
- training on conflict-sensitive communication,
- protection from reprisals, and
- enhanced ability to monitor human rights trends.
Social media networks and local radio stations also possess enormous capacity either to promote unity or exacerbate social divisions. Responsible messaging is therefore essential to mitigate further polarization.
6. International and Regional Dimensions
Given Nigeria’s pivotal role in West African peace and security, failure to contain Boko Haram has implications far beyond national borders. The group’s operations have increasingly taken on a transnational character, affecting Cameroon, Niger, and Chad.
6.1 Opportunities for Security Sector Reform (SSR)
ECOWAS protocols emphasize the need for coherent regional frameworks to confront 21st-century security threats. The 2012 Regional Conference on Counter-Terrorism in Abuja underscores a growing recognition that states must coordinate security sector reforms, intelligence sharing, and legal frameworks.
A well-governed security sector is indispensable for peace. Conversely, an abusive security sector undermines legitimacy, erodes trust, and fuels insurgency.
6.2 Cross-Border Initiatives: CNMC/UNOWA
The Cameroon–Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC), supported by the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), has built trust between the two states through peaceful boundary management and local cross-border initiatives (CBIs). These projects have significant potential to:
- improve livelihoods in regions vulnerable to Boko Haram recruitment,
- foster cooperative security,
- promote cross-border policing, and
- reduce community grievances that insurgents exploit.
Notably, CBIs planned near areas such as Mubi could reduce recruitment by providing alternative economic opportunities for unemployed youth.
7. The Role of Women in Peacebuilding
The reported inclusion of Aisha Alkali Wakil in Boko Haram’s proposed negotiation team highlights an important opportunity: it reinforces the argument that durable peace processes must include women. Women’s participation enhances legitimacy, broadens perspectives, and aligns with global norms such as UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.
Even if Boko Haram’s motives are unclear, the symbolism of nominating a woman challenges prevailing stereotypes within extremist movements and offers Nigerian stakeholders an entry point to elevate women’s roles in peacebuilding.
8. Conclusion
The possibility of dialogue between the Nigerian government and Boko Haram presents both an opportunity and a risk. On one hand, negotiations could begin to reverse cycles of violence, support reconciliation, and create pathways for regional stability. On the other hand, if pursued without safeguards, they could allow Boko Haram to regroup and strengthen.
Key conclusions include:
- Excessive use of force and human rights violations will exacerbate the crisis. They will increase Boko Haram’s recruitment potential and feed into narratives portraying the group as fighting state injustice.
- Civil society and media must be empowered to enhance oversight of security agencies, promote accurate information, and sustain public engagement with peace initiatives.
- Nigeria must carefully balance accountability with amnesty. Sustainable peace requires both justice for victims and pragmatic reconciliation measures.
- Socioeconomic interventions are essential to address the root causes of radicalisation—particularly youth unemployment, corruption, and underdevelopment in the northeast.
- Cross-border cooperation through CNMC/UNOWA and ECOWAS remains vital for addressing transnational threats and ensuring that instability does not cascade across the region.
- Nigeria has the capacity and potential to remain a stable democracy. A peaceful and secure Nigeria will have a positive gravitational effect on West African stability; conversely, a destabilised Nigeria poses risks for the entire region.
Ultimately, Nigeria must be supported in pursuing a holistic, rights-respecting, and inclusive strategy for addressing the Boko Haram crisis. The stakes are high: national stability, regional peace, and long-term development depend on the choices made today. For Ghana, there are important lessons to be drawn from observing these dynamics from a distance. One of Ghana’s greatest advantages in the fight against terrorism is time—good planning leads to good outcomes, while poor preparation can be disastrous.
Written by Emmanuel A. Sowatey
10 November 2012
Email: [email protected]
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